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Inadvertent Resurrection of the Equitable 
Parentage Doctrine in Missouri? An 
Evaluation of Motions for Third Party 
Custody and Defining a “Natural Father” 
Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) 
Bailey M. Schamel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental tenets of family law is that parents have constitu-
tionally protected rights to their children.1  The oldest protected fundamental 
right for parents is that of care, custody, and control of their own children.2  
Despite this parental right being established and unquestioned, courts are mak-
ing surprising decisions as the rise in non-marital childbearing and non-tradi-
tional families muddles the question of which adults are best vested with legal 
rights to children.3 
This Note discusses the 2018 Supreme Court of Missouri decision of 
Bowers v. Bowers, which awarded full custody of a child to her stepfather.4  
The facts in Bowers are discussed in Part II.  Part III analyzes the Missouri 
Uniform Parentage Act and the approaches the Supreme Court of Missouri and 
Missouri appellate courts have taken when a child’s non-biological parent 
seeks full custody.  Part IV explains the Supreme Court of Missouri’s rationale 
in granting full custody to the stepfather through a motion for third party cus-
tody and the dissent’s disagreement.  Finally, Part V discusses why the Bowers 
court should not have awarded the stepparent custody as a third party and in-
stead should have considered the stepparent to be the “natural father.”  Part V 
 
*B.S., Business Administration, University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Re-
view, 2018–2019.  I am grateful to Professor Beck and the entire Missouri Law Review 
staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Joanna L. Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 
309 (2017). 
 2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in 
this case – the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
 3. See Grossman, supra note 1, at 307. 
 4. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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explores the consequences the decision to award third party custody in this in-
stance could entail. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
This case arises out of a divorce between the birth mother of a child and 
the man she married, who has no biological relation to the child, and the cus-
tody battle over the child that ensued.5  In May of 2013, Jason Bowers filed for 
divorce from Jessica Bowers as well as for Determination of Physical and Le-
gal Custody and for Order of Child Support.6  Jason alleged that J.B. was “born 
of the marriage,” which means he and Jessica were J.B.’s legal parents, and 
asked for joint legal and physical custody of J.B. with Jessica.7  Jessica filed 
two pleadings in response, denying the allegation that J.B. was “born of the 
marriage” and claiming she was born prior to the marriage; however, she des-
ignated Jason as the “legal father” of J.B., which put him on equal legal footing 
as Jessica, and asked for sole legal and physical custody8 of J.B. with rights of 
visitation to Jason.9 
Jason and Jessica Bower’s romantic relationship began in October of 
2007, and it is undisputed that Jessica was pregnant with a child conceived with 
a different man named Stephen Nugent when the relationship with Jason be-
gan.10  It was agreed during Jessica’s pregnancy that Jason, rather than Stephen, 
should be the father of J.B.11  Stephen agreed to this decision and voluntarily 
permitted Jason to act as J.B.’s father.12 
Jason attended prenatal medical appointments with Jessica and was pre-
sent in the delivery room when she gave birth to J.B. on April 28, 2008.13  
Shortly after J.B. was born, Jessica and Jason executed a Missouri Affidavit 
Acknowledging Paternity (“Acknowledgement”).14  This resulted in the State 
of Missouri issuing a birth certificate naming Jason as the “father” of J.B.15  In 
 
 5. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *1–2 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 30, 2017), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018). 
 6. Id. at *2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. When a parent has sole custody, he or she has exclusive physical (i.e., the child 
lives with them) and legal (i.e., the “the right and responsibility to make major decisions 
regarding the child’s welfare, including matters of education, medical care and emo-
tional, moral and religious development”) custody rights concerning the child.  The 
other parent has visitation rights and can visit with the child.  See Sole Custody, 
FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/child-custody/sole-custody.html (last visited May 
29, 2018). 
 9. Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *2. 
 10. Id. at *1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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April of 2010, about two years after J.B.’s birth, Jason and Jessica got mar-
ried.16  Jessica, Jason, and J.B. resided together as a family until Jason and 
Jessica split in August of 2012.17  Throughout J.B.’s life, Jason had fulfilled 
the role of J.B.’s father.  He taught her how to walk and how to ride a bike, 
attended her medical appointments, and provided financial support.18  During 
the first five years of J.B.’s life, she did not have any contact or interaction with 
Stephen, nor did Stephen provide any financial support for J.B.19  Stephen also 
had a tendency to leave children he fathered with other women and was not 
involved in providing emotional or financial support for his children, even the 
child involved in this custody dispute.20 
In January of 2014, Stephen Nugent filed a Motion to Intervene and a 
Third Party Respondent’s Petition for Determination of Father-Child Relation-
ship and Order of Custody (“Motion to Intervene”).21  Stephen sought to estab-
lish his paternity rights and an award of joint legal and physical custody of J.B., 
pursuant to the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act.22  Genetic testing was per-
formed, and it was determined there was a 99.9% probability Stephen was the 
biological father of J.B.23  As a result, Jessica filed a motion to dismiss Jason’s 
request for custody and support; Jason then filed an Alternative Motion for 
Third Party Custody pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes section 
452.375.5(5), seeking sole legal and physical custody of J.B.24 
The trial court held that Stephen was unfit, unsuitable, and unable to have 
custody of J.B.25  The court also found Jessica’s contravention of numerous 
court orders demonstrated she was unlikely to obey future court orders requir-
ing her to allow J.B. to have meaningful contact with Jason.26  Jessica and Ja-
son’s inability to co-parent rendered joint custody impossible, and the court 
awarded sole legal and physical custody of J.B. to Jason as a third party custo-
dian, with rights of visitation to Jessica and no rights to Stephen (although the 
court did order J.B.’s birth certificate to be amended to show Stephen, not Ja-
son, as the father).27  Jessica appealed this decision, claiming the finding that 
she was unfit or unsuitable to have custody was not based on sufficient evi-
dence and that granting Jason sole legal and physical custody through a third 
party motion was inappropriate because he was already a party to the dissolu-
tion proceeding.28 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at *17. 
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, agreed with the trial 
court’s decision.29  The court held Jessica’s disregard of J.B.’s medical needs 
and inability to follow court orders, in addition to other evidence, constituted 
sufficient indication of her inability to co-parent and supported the trial court’s 
finding that she was unfit or unsuitable to have custody.30  Additionally, the 
court held that awarding Jason sole legal and physical custody as a third party 
custodian was appropriate, despite his current party status in the dissolution 
proceeding, because all matters regarding custody or visitation of J.B., includ-
ing paternity determinations, were heard in the same proceeding and all inter-
ested parties were given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and to 
be heard by the trial court.31  The dissent in the Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Eastern District, case disagreed with how custody was awarded to Jason.32 
Judge Lisa P. Page wrote the dissent and concurred in the decision granting 
Jason sole legal and physical custody but disagreed with the fact that it was 
granted with a third party custodian motion and argued that Jason – not Stephen 
– was J.B.’s “natural father.”33  The dissenting opinion began by assuming the 
majority opinion was correct in finding Jason was a third party and analyzed 
the holding as if Stephen were the natural father of J.B.34  Even if this were the 
case, the dissent argued third party custody was wholly inappropriate.35  Judge 
Page cited D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K. and stated the custody of J.B. could not proce-
durally be decided within the dissolution of Jessica and Jason if Stephen is 
J.B.’s natural father.36  Accordingly, the dissent believed the proceedings in 
which Jason’s claim might possibly have correctly been adjudicated were 
within Stephen’s paternity action or independent cause of action.37  However, 
even though the majority held Jason’s motion for third party custody was cor-
rect procedurally, the dissent still raised substantive issues.38 
Despite this confusion regarding the procedural requirements, the dissent 
argued the substantive law governing the adjudication of third party custody 
was not confusing.39  The dissent argued that in order for a third party to be 
granted custody, according to Missouri common law, the third party needs to 
show that both parents are unfit or the welfare of the child requires and it is in 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *3–4. 
 31. Id. at *4. 
 32. Id. at *5 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citing D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K., 428 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) 
(“[T]he court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to determine the 
custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the parties.”)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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the best interest of the child for the petitioner to be the custodian of the child.40  
The dissent agreed with Stephen’s unfitness but argued that the trial court’s 
determination of Jessica as unfit was tied to her inability to co-parent with Ja-
son.41  After determining that Jessica was unfit, the trial court awarded Jessica 
physical custody five of fourteen nights, so the dissent argued she was appar-
ently not an unfit parent outside her inability to co-parent with Jason.42  After 
disagreeing with the trial court’s holding of Jessica as unfit, the dissent also 
argued that affirming this award pursuant to the third-party provision in section 
453.375.5(5) based on the “welfare of the child” was wholly inappropriate be-
cause in the few cases where trial courts have divested a biological parent of 
custodial rights premised upon the “welfare of the child,” the facts are much 
more egregious than in the Bowers’ case, and custody in those cases is often 
awarded to a biological relative, not a former stepparent.43  The dissent cited 
both Giesler v. Giesler and K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K. in support of this 
statement.44  The dissent believed that an award of third party custody should 
not be premised on a natural parent and former stepparent’s inability to get 
along.45 
The dissent stated that a Missouri requirement for awarding third party 
custody is the unfitness of both parents.46  Jessica was not unfit because her 
conduct, while reprehensible, was not comparable to the cases in which Mis-
souri has awarded third party custody like Giesler and K.S.H., and Jason should 
not be awarded third party custody, assuming Stephen is the natural father.47  
Jason did not provide enough evidence to rebut the presumption of fitness of 
Jessica as a parent.48  By granting third party custody to Jason, the dissent ar-
gued the majority opinion inadvertently resurrected the concept of “equitable 
parentage,” which the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected.49 
The dissent further stated the majority avoided the question of law as to 
whether Jason could actually be designated as a third party and either (1) pre-
supposed the designation was appropriate as a matter of law or (2) conflated 
three possible separate causes of action – dissolutions, paternity, and an inde-
pendent third party custody petition – and failed to clarify to which action Jason 
 
 40. Id. (citing Jones v. Jones, 10 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)); see also 
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 41. Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *5 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at *6. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (citing Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming 
third party custodial rights to aunt and uncle of children); K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K., 
355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there was 
evidence of abuse)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *7. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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was a third party.50  This affirmation of the third party custody award did not 
address the point on appeal and inappropriately focused on procedural issues, 
rather than substantive issues, and the dissent stated it was inappropriate to 
designate Jason as a third party as he should be considered J.B.’s “natural fa-
ther.”51 
The dissent based its opinion that Jason should be considered the “natural 
father” on statutory interpretation of four statutes: sections 210.834.4, 210.823, 
210.822.1, and 210.822.2 of the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act.52  It initially 
seemed problematic that section 210.834.4 states  whenever the blood tests 
show a person presumed or alleged to be the father of a child is not the father 
of a child, it is conclusive of non-paternity.53  However, the dissent argued that 
even though in most cases Stephen’s genetic test results would guarantee him 
the ability to rebut by clear and convincing evidence all other “presumed natu-
ral fathers,” that was not true in this case.54  The dissent argued this is because 
the execution of an Acknowledgment of Paternity seven years before Stephen’s 
cause of action constituted a legal finding of paternity and established Jason as 
J.B.’s natural father.55 
The dissent argued that this is a matter of statutory interpretation and 
quoted a Missouri case that stated, “[W]e presume that the legislature did not 
insert superfluous language or idle verbiage in a statute.”56  Therefore, the dis-
sent argued that because these two statutes both create legal findings of pater-
nity, the court was required to move to the second step of section 210.822.2 
and resolve the conflict of presumed fatherhood between Jason and Stephen.57  
The dissent argued that sections 210.832 and 210.822.2 provided a basis for 
Jason to be considered the “natural father” because the Paternity Acknowledg-
ment affidavit resulted in Jason’s name being listed on J.B.’s birth certificate.58  
This Acknowledgement creates conflicting presumptions of who the “natural 
father” is between Jason and Stephen, and the dissent believed it should be 
resolved in Jason’s favor using the “weightier considerations of policy and 
logic.”59 
The dissent believed determining whom the trial court should select as 
the father based on “weightier considerations of policy and logic” between a 
man who is the biological father of a child and a man who has successfully 
completed an Acknowledgement of Paternity for the same child was an issue 
 
 50. Id. at *9. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *13–16. 
 53. See id. at *16; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 210.834.4 (2016). 
 54. Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *16 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting Dubinsky v. St. Louis Blues Hockey Club, 229 S.W.3d 126, 130 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *17. 
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of first impression in Missouri courts and the court was without guidance.60  
The dissent examined cases from other jurisdictions and found that the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court interpreted the standard of “weightier considerations of 
policy and logic” to allow courts to consider both the sociological and psycho-
logical consequences of its decision as to which man should be considered the 
natural father.61  Other states, like Colorado and California, also allow for fact-
intensive inquiries and consider the child’s well-being.62  According to the dis-
sent, based upon the decisions of other states, Stephen’s inability to present any 
evidence as to why he should prevail in consideration of policy and logic, and 
Jason’s consistent presence in J.B.’s life as well as J.B’s attachment to Jason, 
Jason should be deemed the “natural father” of J.B.63 
Lastly, the dissent discussed its agreement with the trial court in awarding 
Jason sole physical and legal custody of J.B. with visitation rights to Jessica.64  
The dissent’s support of this decision was based on the determination that J.B. 
is a “child of the marriage” because of the execution of the Paternity Acknowl-
edgment and the subsequent marriage.65  Because Jason, in the dissent’s mind, 
was considered the “natural father” of J.B., the trial court’s award of full cus-
tody to him over Jessica was not against the great weight of the evidence, and 
deference to the trial court’s decision would be appropriate.66 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court and the appeals 
court, holding the trial court correctly designated Jason “a third-party solely for 
the purpose of determining custody” and determined awarding custody to Ja-
son as a third-party “was not against the weight of the evidence.”67 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Two important areas of Missouri law inform the analysis of the Bowers 
decision: the “equitable parentage” doctrine in relation to awards for third party 
custody and the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act (“MoUPA”). 
A. “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine and Awards for Third Party    
Custody 
Because the ideas of past awards for third party custody and the equitable 
parentage doctrine are so interrelated, they are discussed together below. 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (citing GDK v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 
2004)). 
 62. Id. (citing N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc); Craig L. 
v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 63. Id. at *18. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *20. 
 67. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 615, 617 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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1. Past Awards for and Against Third Party Custody in Missouri 
Section 452.375.5 of the Missouri statutory code describes the situations 
in which third party custody may be awarded.68  The statute provides two 
grounds for which third party custody, temporary custody, or visitation may be 
granted: 1) when the court finds that the welfare of a child requires third party 
custody and such custody is in the best interest of the child, or 2) when the 
court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian.69  
In addition, the courts must find the third parties “to be suitable and able to 
provide an adequate and stable environment for the child.”70  The following 
cases have interpreted parental fitness and the situations in which the welfare 
of the child requires an award of third party custody. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the trial court’s 
award of third party custody to the children’s paternal aunt and uncle in Gies-
ler.71  In Giesler, the father was absent, and the court concluded the mother 
“was unable to cope with the demands of parenthood.”72  The mother failed to 
take the children to school, failed to pick them up from school, failed to demon-
strate any interest in the children’s school progress, failed to timely obtain the 
children’s immunizations, failed to obtain child-care for the children while she 
was at work, and failed to provide a stable home.73  The evidence also indicated 
that the mother moved into the home of her boyfriend while still married and 
that the boyfriend directed vile language toward the children and physically 
abused the mother.74  The aunt and uncle were granted custody as third parties 
because the court determined they were best suited to care for the child.75 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of third party custody in K.S.H. in 2011.76  In this case, custody 
was awarded to the child’s grandmother rather than to the natural parents be-
cause “there was evidence of physical abuse, emotional abuse, a chaotic home 
environment, neglect of health needs, the lack of a healthy parent-child rela-
tionship, emotional manipulation, and consistent poor judgment by [the 
m]other.”77  A school nurse noticed bruises and red welts on the child’s arms 
and made a hotline call to Family Services.78  The living situation was unsafe 
for the child, and the court awarded custody to the grandmother because the 
welfare of the child required it.79 
 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. § 452.375.5(5)(a). 
 71. Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 60–61. 
 74. Id. at 61. 
 75. Id. at 62. 
 76. K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 77. Id. at 521. 
 78. Id. at 517. 
 79. Id. at 521. 
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Alternatively, Missouri courts have rejected third party custody, albeit in 
earlier cases. A Missouri court has held section 452.375.5, the statute that gov-
erns motions for third party custody, “creat[es] a rebuttable presumption that 
parents are fit, suitable, and able custodians of their children and that their wel-
fare is best served by awarding their custody to their parents.”80 The Missouri 
Court of Appeals, Southern District, reversed the trial court’s ruling in In re 
Marriage of Horinek in 2001.81  In Horinek, the court reversed an award of 
third party custody to paternal grandparents because they failed to sufficiently 
rebut this presumption of fitness of the child’s mother.82  The trial court cited 
several reasons for finding the mother unfit, including: the mother’s proposal 
to remove the child to Florida and leave the child in the care of the maternal 
grandmother a majority of the time while the mother went to school, the fact 
that the mother’s proposed move would sever the child’s relationship with her 
father and father’s family, the mother’s lack of maturity, the child’s strong re-
lationship with the paternal grandparents, and the fact that the child’s primary 
home was the residence of the paternal grandparents.83  The court also cited 
that the mother received a discharge from the Navy based on a personality dis-
order, that she frequently lied to health providers, and that she may have at-
tempted to commit suicide.84  The trial court noted a history of domestic vio-
lence between the parents but found no substantial evidence that this abuse 
involved the child.85 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, stated that while the 
mother had made many mistakes in her young life – including smoking mari-
juana three times, snorting methamphetamine twice, and drinking beer while 
pregnant – the mother’s mistakes seemed directly tied to the father.86  The 
mother claimed she never used drugs prior to moving to Missouri with the fa-
ther.87  The father had a history of violence with the mother, and the two had 
several arguments and at least two physical altercations.88  The evidence also 
showed the father was much more involved in illegal drugs than was the 
mother.89  However, the marriage was over and the mother then lived with the 
child’s maternal grandmother in a stable, peaceful home.90  The court over-
turned the trial court’s decision and held the mother to be fit.91 
 
 80. Flathers v. Flathers, 948 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 81. In re Marriage of Horinek, 41 S.W.3d 897, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 82. Id. at 901, 908. 
 83. Id. at 903. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 904. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 908. 
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2. “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine 
The equitable parentage doctrine awards custody to a “better” parent in-
stead of the natural parent because that substitution is in the best interests of 
the children.92  Additionally, the doctrine implies the third party, a non-parent, 
is equivalent to a natural parent and legally on equal footing.93  This doctrine 
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the 1998 case Cot-
ton v. Wise, a decision in which the court reversed an award of custody to the 
children’s older sister instead of the father because Missouri’s guardianship 
statute provided sufficient statutory protection over the interests of the chil-
dren.94  The guardianship statute states that guardianship may be granted in 
three situations: when the minor child has no living parent, when the parent or 
parents of a minor are “unwilling, unable, or . . . unfit” to be a guardian, or 
when the minor’s parents have had their parental rights terminated.95 
The Cotton trial court awarded the sister custody of the minor children 
even though the father had not been deemed unfit because placement with the 
father and elimination of contact with their older sister would have negatively 
affected the children’s growth and development.96  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that the trial court erred and stated the award of custody to the older 
sister “must be premised upon a finding that the natural parent is unfit, unable, 
or unwilling to care for his children.”97 
The court may consider several factors listed in a Missouri statute when 
determining the fitness of a parent, including but not limited to: any felony 
violations, any history of physical and mental abuse, the willingness to actively 
perform his or her functions as a parent for the needs of the child, and the in-
teraction and interrelationship of the child with the parent.98  What may not be 
considered, however, is whether the child would be “better off” with a third 
party.99 
Missouri courts have continued to reject the equitable parentage doctrine.  
A recent example of this rejection is In re L.M.100  The In re L.M. court reversed 
a grant of guardianship to the great-uncle and great-aunt of a child because “the 
determination of parental unfitness may not be made by comparing the relative 
merits of the parent with those of a third party seeking the guardianship over 
 
 92. Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. MO. REV. STAT. § 475.030 (2016). 
 96. Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264. 
 97. Id. 
 98. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 99. See id.; see also Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264–65. 
 100. In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); see also C.L. v. M.T., 
335 S.W.3d 19, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that the circuit court estab-
lished a guardianship over the child . . . based solely upon the best interests of the child, 
it was in error.”). 
10
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the child.”101  The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the 
trial court because it considered the best interests of the child in deciding cus-
tody between the father, great-uncle, and great-aunt before first determining 
whether the father was fit to have custody.102  The trial court should have first 
determined whether the father was fit using the statutory considerations before 
awarding guardianship to a third party in light of the presumption the father 
was the child’s appropriate custodian.103  The court must focus on the parent’s 
ability to provide for the child on his or her own – it cannot compare the merits 
of the parent to the third party.104 
B. Missouri Uniform Parentage Act (MoUPA) and Other Relevant 
Statutes 
Section 210 of the Missouri statutory code includes the MoUPA.105  It 
was first enacted in 1987, encompassing sections 210.817 to 210.854, and its 
purpose “was to establish a uniform means for deciding paternity that would 
protect the rights of all parties involved, especially children.”106  This act has 
several provisions that are relevant to Bowers, including sections 210.834.4, 
210.823, 210.822.1, and 210.822.2. 
Section 210.834 generally covers the law of blood tests in regard to cus-
tody battles.107  Specifically, section 210.834.4 states, “Whenever the court 
finds . . . the results of the blood tests show that a person presumed or alleged 
to be the father of the child is not the father of such child, such evidence shall 
be conclusive of nonpaternity and the court shall dismiss the action as to that 
party.”108  The plain language of this statute shows Missouri’s tendency to fa-
vor the biological father in custody decisions in that a blood test indicating 
paternity trumps all other findings of fatherhood.109  The Revised Uniform Par-
entage Act, promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission for states to use as 
a model, has replaced blood tests with genetic testing, but Missouri’s Uniform 
Parentage Act does not reflect this replacement and relies strictly on blood 
tests.110 
Section 210.823 details that an acknowledgement of paternity is consid-
ered a legal finding of paternity.111  It states that a signed acknowledgment 
 
 101. In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d at 216. 
 102. Id. at 216–17. 
 103. Id. at 217. 
 104. See id. 
 105. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.817–210.854 (2016). 
 106. State v. Dodd, 961 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 107. § 210.834. 
 108. Id. § 210.834.4. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See generally UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017). 
 111. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823.1 (2016). 
11
Schamel: Inadvertent Resurrection of the Equitable Parentage Doctrine in M
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
486 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
“shall be considered a legal finding of paternity subject to the right of either 
signatory to rescind the acknowledgment.”112  This rescission must be filed 
within the earlier of “sixty days from the date of the last signature” or “[t]he 
date of an administrative or judicial proceeding to establish a support order in 
which the signatory is a party.”113  The acknowledgment can be challenged in 
court on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake.114  However, if the 
acknowledgement of paternity is unchallenged, a judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding is not required to ratify it.115 
Sections 210.822.1 and 210.822.2 discuss when a man shall be presumed 
to be the natural father of a child and when that presumption can be rebutted.116  
Several classes of men are presumed to be the natural father, including men 
who “[a]n expert concludes that the blood tests show that the alleged parent is 
not excluded and that the probability of paternity is ninety-eight percent or 
higher.”117  Section 210.822.2 discusses that “[a] presumption pursuant to [sec-
tion 210.822] may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and con-
vincing evidence.”118  It also provides that “[i]f two or more presumptions arise 
which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded 
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”119  Missouri 
courts have held the correct analysis under section 210.822.2 is to first deter-
mine whether clear and convincing evidence rebuts the presumption that a pre-
sumed natural father is actually the natural father.120  If the first step leaves 
more than one presumed natural father, the trial court then must determine 
which of the remaining presumed natural fathers is founded on the “weightier 
considerations of policy and logic.”121  The dissent in the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Eastern District, opinion in Bowers claimed that these considerations 
were an issue of first impression for the court.122 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, applied sections 
210.832 and 210.822.2 in Courtney v. Roggy.123  In Roggy, the six-year-old 
child over which custody was being determined was born during the husband 
and wife’s marriage, and both the husband and the wife were named on the 
child’s birth certificate.124  The husband and wife were both aware the husband 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 210.823.1(2). 
 115. Id. 
 116. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.822.1, 210.822.2 (2016). 
 117. Id. § 210.822.1. 
 118. Id. § 210.822.2. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Courtney v. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 
2018). 
 123. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d at 146–48. 
 124. Id. at 144. 
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was not the child’s biological father.125  While the husband and wife were still 
married, the biological father of the child filed an action to determine paternity 
and wanted to be declared the father of the child.126  The biological father had 
several contacts with the child, including trips out of town and holidays.127  The 
trial court granted the petition and determined that the biological father’s blood 
test was clear and convincing evidence that rebutted the husband’s presumption 
as the child’s natural father.128  The Roggy court did not touch the “weightier 
considerations of policy and logic” issue because no conflicting presumptions 
existed; the DNA test trumped all other findings of paternity.129 
Another relevant statute to consider, which is not within the Uniform Par-
entage Act, is section 452.375 of Missouri’s statutory code.130  This statute 
provides information regarding the determination of custody within a dissolu-
tion of marriage and the relevant factors a court may consider when awarding 
custody of a child.131  These factors include but are not limited to: the wishes 
of the child’s parents, the need of the child for a meaningful relationship with 
both parents, the ability and willingness of the child’s parents to perform their 
functions as parents for the needs of the child, which parent is going to allow 
the child contact with the other parent, and any history of abuse.132 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
Judge George W. Draper wrote the majority opinion, holding that the ev-
idence relied upon by the trial court supported the finding that Jessica was unfit 
to have custody of J.B. and that Jason was entitled to sole physical and legal 
custody advanced by his third party custody motion with visitation rights to 
Jessica.133  Judge Zel M. Fischer concurred in the result but filed a separate 
opinion holding that Jessica’s first point relied on, which argued the finding 
she was unfit was not supported by substantial evidence, preserved nothing for 
appellate review.134  Judge Fischer’s opinion, while important, is not relevant 
to the argument made by this Note and is therefore not discussed below – only 
Judge Draper’s opinion is discussed. 
The court first addressed the procedural issues and discussed Jessica’s 
reliance on a Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, case entitled In re 
Marriage of Said to support her argument that “because Jason already was a 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 145. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 146. 
 129. Id. at 145–47. 
 130. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 131. Id. § 452.375.2. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 610, 616–17 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 134. Id. at 617–18 (Fischer, C.J., concurring). 
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party to the dissolution, he. . .could not be designated as a third party for pur-
poses of custody.”135  Jessica argued In re Marriage of Said supported her po-
sition because the Southern District dismissed a stepfather’s claim of custody 
during a dissolution proceeding.136  However, the majority stated Jason’s mo-
tion for third-party custody was different from In re Marriage of Said because 
the Southern District’s holding was limited to the “extraordinary facts” of the 
case.137 
The majority held Jason’s case was factually different in that  Jason did 
not assert his position as the stepparent as a ground for custody, as the steppar-
ent incorrectly did in In re Marriage of Said.138  The majority also argued an-
other factual difference was that Jason alleged both Jessica and Stephen were 
unfit to be J.B.’s custodians, something that was not done in In re Marriage of 
Said.139  Additionally, the majority stated that the record showed after the dis-
solution was filed by Jason, “Jessica actively sought out Stephen” and encour-
aged him “to assert his paternity rights.”140  The record also showed Jessica 
helped Stephen get an attorney to file his claim for custody.141  The majority 
stated that the court was “disinclined to grant Jessica relief based on error she 
actively invited” and found the trial court “did not err” when it designated Ja-
son as a third party to determine custody.142 
Next, the majority discussed Jessica’s argument that the trial court’s find-
ing of her unfitness was in error.143  The majority listed seven reasons that sup-
ported the trial court’s finding, four of which were about her inability to co-
parent with Jason and her unwillingness to let Jason see the child.144  The other 
three were: her disregard for J.B.’s medical needs, intending to remove J.B. 
from her current school, and placing her own interests ahead of J.B.’s.145  While 
the majority recognized the presumption “that the best interest of a child is best 
served by vesting custody of the child with” a biological parent, it argued this 
presumption can be rebutted.146  In order to rebut this presumption, a third party 
that seeks custody has to show that each parent is unfit or the welfare of the 
child requires third party custody.147 
The court also noted that Jason is not just any third party, but rather his 
third-party claim “is being asserted by an individual . . . specifically invited by 
a biological parent to act as a parent of the [child] at issue, and in fact acted in 
 
 135. Id. at 613 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. at 614. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 614–15.  
 142. Id. at 615. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 615–16. 
 147. Id. at 616. 
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that capacity for an extended period of time.”148  The majority stated that it 
would not reweigh the evidence, and it believed that Jessica did not present any 
evidence that demonstrated the circuit court’s judgment was in error.149  The 
majority also stated that while it was not required to find the child’s welfare 
required the award of third-party custody, Jessica’s intention to destroy the re-
lationship between the child and Jason could support the trial court’s finding 
that the welfare of J.B. required Jason to have custody.150  The Supreme Court 
of Missouri affirmed the circuit court and the appellate court.151 
V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in this case operationally alters 
the standard for grants of third party custody in Missouri.  The dissenting opin-
ion of the Missouri Court of Appeals has the better legal analysis both proce-
durally and substantively in regard to the motion for third party custody and 
would have denied the motion and written a much deeper discussion on the 
substantive issues.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s failure to follow the dis-
senting opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals has inadvertently resurrected 
the “equitable parentage” doctrine. This Part concludes by discussing why Ja-
son should have been considered the “natural father” and awarded custody or, 
in the alternative, Jessica should have been awarded custody. 
A. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Misapplication of the Legal 
Standard for Third Party Custody Awards 
Awarding custody of a child to the stepfather in this case through a motion 
for third custody is wholly inappropriate.  While some confusion surrounds the 
procedural legal authority that governs awards of third party custody, it is clear 
that a child’s custody cannot be decided within the proceedings for dissolution 
of marriage if both parties are not the natural parents.152  Missouri courts have 
held that “the court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to 
determine the custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the 
parties.”153  Although the procedural issues are important, this Note primarily 
focuses on the substantive issue in Bowers regarding third party custody mo-
tions, which is in stark contrast with Missouri law.  In order to award third 
 
 148. Id. (quoting McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 447–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015)) (alteration in original). 
 149. Id. at 616–17. 
 150. Id. at 617. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K. v. D.L.T., 428 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); 
see also In re Marriage of Said, 26 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (stating a 
custody action was “foreign to the dissolution action” and that it should have been a 
“separate action” and not adjudicated in the dissolution proceeding). 
 153. D.S.K., 428 S.W.3d at 659. 
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party custody over the child’s natural parents, Missouri law is clear that the 
third party must first show that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be 
a custodian or that the welfare of the child requires third party custody and that 
it is the best interest of the child.154 
The trial court and Supreme Court of Missouri’s finding of Jessica’s un-
fitness is focused almost solely on the hostility between herself and the child’s 
former stepfather, Jason.155  In particular, the Supreme Court of Missouri fo-
cused its finding of unfitness on Jessica’s failure to follow court orders and her 
attempts to destroy the bond between the child and Jason.156  While this behav-
ior is reprehensible, this consideration is inappropriate.157  Prior decisions fo-
cus the finding of a parent’s unfitness in motions for third party custody on the 
parent’s behavior alone and not on whether the parent will allow the third party 
to see the child.158 
After finding her to be unfit, the trial court awarded Jessica five out of 
fourteen nights of physical custody.159  The majority in the Missouri Court of 
Appeals seemed to confirm this contradictory finding, supporting its reasoning 
by quoting section 452.375.2 and stating that one of the relevant factors in de-
termining parental fitness is “[w]hich parent is more likely to allow the child 
frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with the other parent.”160  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri also seemed to confirm this contradictory finding 
by affirming the trial court.161  However, under a third party motion for cus-
tody, Jason is not a parent.  Jason is a third party and legally a non-parent.   
Outside of this inability to co-parent, the court did not mention another finding 
supporting the determination that Jessica was unfit, aside from her disregard of 
the child’s medical needs, sometimes placing her own interests before the 
child’s, and intending to remove the child from her current school.162  While 
these issues are important considerations, it does not rise to the same level of 
conduct as the parents in the previous cases in which third party custody was 
awarded. 
Section 452.375.5 includes the statutory requirements for third-party cus-
tody that have been read to “creat[e] a rebuttable presumption that parents are 
fit, suitable, and able custodians of their children and that their welfare is best 
 
 154. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 155. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 615. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264–65 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 158. See Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming third 
party custodial rights to aunt and uncle of children); see also K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. 
C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there 
was evidence of abuse). 
 159. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 
2018). 
 160. Id. at *3 (majority opinion) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (2016)). 
 161. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 616–17. 
 162. See id. 
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served by awarding their custody to their parents.”163  The inability to co-parent 
with a third party is arguably not enough evidence to overcome this presump-
tion.  In the few cases where Missouri courts have  awarded custody to a third 
party over a biological parent, the behavior at issue is much more egregious.164  
In Giesler, third party custody rights were granted to the aunt and uncle of 
minor children because the father was absent and the mother did several things 
to show she could not cope with the demands of parenthood.165  The mother 
failed to take the children to and from school, failed to timely obtain their im-
munizations, and lived with a physically abusive boyfriend who often caused 
discord in the custody matters between the parties.166  In K.S.H., custody of a 
child was granted to the grandmother because “there was evidence of physical 
abuse, emotional abuse, a chaotic home environment, neglect of health needs, 
the lack of a healthy parent-child relationship, emotional manipulation, and 
consistent poor judgment by [the m]other.”167 
No facts as weighty as those seen in K.S.H. and Giesler support the unfit-
ness finding in this case.  Jessica did not fail to take the child to school, and she 
did not expose the child to abuse.  Instead, the court found her to be unfit mostly 
due to her potential to destroy the bond between the child and Jason.  It should 
be reiterated that Jason is, in this case, a non-genetic parent. 
The facts in Bowers more closely align with the facts in cases in which 
third party custody was denied.  In Horinek, the court held an award of third 
party custody to the child’s paternal grandparents was inappropriate despite the 
mother’s illegal drug use and other problematic behavior because the behavior 
was tied to her ex-husband whom she would no longer have to parent with.168  
Simply removing Jason, the third party, from Jessica’s and the child’s life 
would eliminate the reasons for Jessica’s unfitness.  The court recognized this 
as a course of action in Horinek.169  Jessica may not be the perfect parent; how-
ever, her actions do not rise to a level justifying an award of third party custody 
to Jason. While she seemingly does not want her child to have a relationship 
with Jason, she still provides for J.B., gives J.B. what she needs, and does not 
put J.B. in dangerous situations.170  In ruling this way, the court has inadvert-
ently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine. 
 
 163. Flathers v. Flathers, 948 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 164. See Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Page, J., dissenting); see also Giesler 
v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming third party custodial rights 
to aunt and uncle of children); K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there was evidence of abuse). 
 165. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d at 60–61. 
 166. Id. 
 167. K.S.H., 355 S.W.3d at 521. 
 168. In re Marriage of Horinek, 41 S.W.3d 897, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Mo. Ct. 
App. June 30, 2017) (Page., J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 
2018). 
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B. Resurrection of the “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine 
Although the majority in the Missouri Court of Appeals explicitly denied 
addressing equitable parenting, its award of third party custody to Jason, and 
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s affirmance, arguably resurrects the equitable 
parentage doctrine, which the Supreme Court of Missouri disavowed.171  The 
equitable parentage doctrine, as described above,172 awards custody to the “bet-
ter” parent instead of the natural parent when that substitution seems to be in 
the best interests of the children.173  Missouri courts have held “the determina-
tion of parental unfitness may not be made by comparing the relative merits of 
the parent with those of a third party seeking the guardianship over the 
child.”174  Guardianship and custody are similar concepts but differ slightly in 
the courts in which they are determined and the nature of the relationship be-
tween the child and the adult.175 A guardianship is a court-ordered relationship 
where the adult makes decisions about aspects like the child’s education.176  A 
guardian can be appointed even when a biological parent has custody and pro-
vides care for the child.177  However, an important similarity between guardi-
anship and custody is that both statutes governing third party awards require a 
finding of unfitness of the parents before an award of custody to a third party.178 
Bowers is factually similar to Cotton, in which an award of custody to the 
sister of minor children was reversed, despite the strong relationship between 
the children and their sister, because the award of custody “must be premised 
upon a finding that the natural parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for 
his children.”179  While the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bowers claimed to 
have found Jessica unfit, this finding is insufficient and appears to be related 
to what the court believed is within the best interests of the child.180  The thor-
ough discussion in the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion of the strong re-
lationship between the child and Jason and the potential for significant harm if 
 
 171. See id. at *7; see also Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en 
banc). 
 172. See discussion supra at Part III.A.2. 
 173. Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264. 
 174. In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 175. See generally Difference Between Custody and Guardianship, 7TH JUD. CIR. 
CT., http://www.circuit7.net/familycourt/parentplan/custody-guardianship.aspx (last 
visited May 29, 2018). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 475.030 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 
452.375.5(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 179. Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 180. See Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 616–17 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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this relationship were destroyed underscores the relationship between this anal-
ysis and the court’s holding.181  The focus of Jessica’s “unfitness” was on her 
potential to destroy J.B. and Jason’s relationship.182 
The Supreme Court of Missouri compared the relative merits of Jessica, 
the child’s natural mother, with those of Jason, a third party, by discussing her 
unwillingness to co-parent with him.183  Comparing the merits of a natural par-
ent to a third party when determining fitness and putting a third party on equal 
footing with a natural parent has been expressly disallowed.184  Finding Jessica 
as unfit should make no mention of comparing her abilities to that of a third 
party.  The majority did this by emphasizing that Jessica attempted to eliminate 
Jason’s role in J.B.’s life.185  Without explicitly stating it, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri held that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain a relationship 
with Jason, a third party and a non-parent, and put him on equal footing with 
Jessica, the child’s natural mother. The Supreme Court of Missouri treated the 
child’s relationship with Jason, who the court had ruled is a third party, as 
equally important to the child’s relationship with the child’s natural mother and 
therefore inadvertently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine by extend-
ing the constitutional rights to a non-genetic parent third party.  This could have 
unfortunate, unintended consequences, which are described below. 
The court in Bowers did not follow legally-binding precedent, which is a 
grave legal error. The Supreme Court should have upheld its disallowance of 
the equitable parentage doctrine because enacting it could lead to dire conse-
quences.  Setting this precedent with such a low standard for motions for third 
party custody will likely open the floodgates and is easily subject to abuse.  
Stepparents will likely now file for third party custody during marriage disso-
lution proceedings in order to obtain unfair bargaining power over their 
spouses.  This is especially troubling in domestic violence cases; an abusive 
husband whose abuse has not been revealed to the court and who is the stepfa-
ther of a child could easily exert control over the child’s birth mother and gain 
custody.  Additionally, parents are awarded certain constitutional rights; to ex-
tend these constitutional rights to every stepparent without specific justification 
seems inherently wrong.  Because of this case, it is going to be easier for step-
parents and other third parties to gain custody of a child, which is something 
Missouri has been and should be opposed to. 
C. Awarding Custody to the Correct Person 
In order to avoid the precedent set by awarding Jason third party custody, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri should have awarded him custody by ruling 
 
 181. See id. at 617. 
 182. See id.  
 183. Id. at 615–17. 
 184. In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 
264. 
 185. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 617. 
19
Schamel: Inadvertent Resurrection of the Equitable Parentage Doctrine in M
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
494 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
him to be the “natural father” of the child.  Section 210.834.4 states that when-
ever the blood tests show a person presumed or alleged to be the father of a 
child is not the father of a child, it is conclusive of non-paternity.186  Because 
Stephen’s DNA test showed that he was the biological father, this seems to 
show that Stephen is, in fact, the natural father.  However, Jason and Jessica 
executed an Acknowledgment of Paternity seven years before the blood test 
showed Stephen was the biological father.187  Section 210.823 states that an 
Acknowledgment of Paternity constitutes a legal finding of paternity “subject 
to the right of either signatory to rescind the acknowledgment.”188  This legally 
established Jason as the child’s “natural father,” creating conflicting presump-
tions of natural fatherhood between Stephen and Jason, and the court is re-
quired to evaluate under section 210.822.2 which man should be presumed the 
natural father under “weightier considerations of policy and logic.”189  This is 
an issue of first impression for Missouri courts, but other states have allowed 
for the consideration of the child’s best interests and the sociological and psy-
chological effects of the decision.190 
Stephen has not been in the child’s life since birth and has had no contact 
with the child until he filed his motion to intervene.191  He also had a tendency 
to leave children he fathered with other women and was not involved in provid-
ing emotional or financial support for his children, even the child involved in 
this custody dispute.192  Jason, on the other hand, has been in the child’s life 
since birth and raised the child.193  He also provided financial support and is 
the only father the child has ever known.194  It only makes sense to resolve the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic in his favor.  If Jason were legally 
considered to be the “natural father” as he should have been through the exe-
cution of the Paternity Acknowledgement, the court’s consideration of Jes-
sica’s inability to co-parent under section 452.375(2) would have been legally 
justified and the award of custody to Jason would have been appropriate. 
Even if this argument is unsuccessful, the award of custody to Jason 
through the third-party motion was inappropriate because the finding of Jessica 
as unfit was based on the comparison of her actions to Jason’s, instead of on 
her actions alone.  If Jason is not considered the “natural father,” Jessica should 
be awarded sole physical and legal custody. 
 
 186. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.834.4 (2016). 
 187. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 610. 
 188. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823.1 (2016). 
 189. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.822.2 (2016). 
 190. See, e.g., GDK v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004); 
N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). 
 191. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *17 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at *18. 
 194. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Parental rights are constitutionally protected.195  Allotting these constitu-
tional rights to non-parents of children without holding them to the correct 
standards could have dire consequences.  In Bowers, the court dealt with a cus-
tody battle between a mother, a stepfather, and the child’s biological father.  
The court incorrectly applied the standard for third party custody and, in doing 
so, inadvertently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine, which has been 
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Missouri.  The court improperly 
compared the merits of a parent and non-parent in this determination of cus-
tody.196  The Supreme Court of Missouri should not have confirmed the award 
of third party custody to Jason and instead should have held Jason to be the 
child’s “natural father.”  Because it did not do so, this decision could have 
unfortunate consequences on motions for third party custody in the state of 
Missouri and will likely affect parents’ rights, the protection of which is vital 
to upholding constitutional rights – one of the fundamental purposes of courts 




























 195. Grossman, supra note 1, at 309. 
 196. See id.; Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 615–17. 
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